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PRUDENT POLITICS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
ALLEN S. WEINER∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Like the other international and hybrid criminal tribunals that have 
come before it, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has faced 
substantial challenges in building a new prosecutorial and judicial 
institution in a sometimes inhospitable environment. Some of the obvious 
challenges that arise in establishing a new international criminal court are 
institutional, such as the need to build the organization, to hire qualified 
staff, to secure adequate funding, etc. The Court also faces operational 
challenges, such as the need to develop modalities for conducting 
investigations around the world, to provide security for witnesses, to 
develop detention practices, etc. Finally, other challenges involve taking 
on the obstacles that arise on the broader geopolitical landscape. In 
particular, the Court operates in a world where the commitment of states 
and international institutions to the underlying goal of international justice 
is sometimes subordinated to other political considerations.1 Such 
geopolitical challenges can include the temptation on the part of states 
involved in conflict resolution efforts to try to resolve an ongoing conflict 
by granting amnesty to perpetrators of serious crimes, or the Court’s 
 
 
 ∗ Senior Lecturer in Law and Director, Stanford Program in International and Comparative 
Law, Stanford Law School. This paper is based on a presentation I delivered on September 12, 2012, 
at a conference organized by the Washington University School of Law in honor of the 10th 
anniversary of the establishment of the International Criminal Court. I am grateful to the organizers 
and sponsors of the conference, and especially Leila Sadat, for the opportunity to participate. I am 
indebted to the other attendees at the conference for the important insights they shared during their 
presentations and for their comments on my remarks. I note in this regard that I owe the phrase 
“prudent politics” in the title to a helpful suggestion by Professor Shahram Dana. I am also grateful to 
Sara Shirazyan for research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in ICC Referrals, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/16/un-security-council-address 
-inconsistency-icc-referrals-0 (noting that despite the Security Council’s initial unanimous decision to 
refer the Libya situation to the ICC, “once political circumstances changed in Libya, the Security 
Council no longer actively supported the ICC investigation and failed to press Libya’s new 
government to cooperate with the court.”). 
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management of relationships with powerful third parties, such as the well-
known complexities of its evolving relationship with the United States.2 
But another essential element of building an international criminal 
court like the ICC is the challenge of enhancing its institutional status, 
legitimacy, and effectiveness in the international system. What I suggest in 
this essay is that in light of these concerns, another essential set of factors 
we should examine in thinking about building an institution like the ICC 
are those related to the political dimensions of the prosecutorial strategy 
adopted by the Court’s Office of the Prosecutor, particularly in the nascent 
stages of the institution. (And although the ICC has been in existence for 
ten years, it seems fair to suggest that in terms of establishing its 
international status, legitimacy, and effectiveness, the institution is still in 
its early days.) I make the somewhat scandalous claim—scandalous at 
least among international legal scholars and international lawyers, both 
groups of persons committed to the impartial rule of law—that the 
prosecutor of an international court like the ICC3 needs to make careful 
and self-conscious political choices regarding charging strategies, 
particularly during the formative stages of the tribunal, in order to enhance 
the effectiveness and international standing of the institution.4 
 
 
 2. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State & Stephen J. Rapp, 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Special Briefing at Washington, DC: U.S. Engagement 
With the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference (June 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/143178.htm. 
 Summarizing U.S. engagement with the ICC, Mr. Koh recounts: 
[A]fter 12 years, I think we have reset the default on the U.S. relationship with the court from 
hostility to positive engagement. In this case, principled engagement worked to protect our 
interest[s], to improve the outcome, and to bring us renewed international goodwill. As one 
delegate put it to me, the U.S. was once again seen, with respect to the ICC, as part of the 
solution and not the problem. The outcome in Kampala demonstrates again principled 
engagement can protect and advance our interests, it can help the states parties to find better 
solutions, and make for a better court, better protection of our interests, and a better 
relationship going forward between the U.S. and the ICC.  
 3. I use the phrase “institutions like the ICC” or variants of it throughout this essay. I note in 
this regard that the arguments advanced in this essay are based in no small part on my own experience 
dealing with the ad hoc tribunals that served as the ICC’s predecessor institutions—the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
Before joining the faculty at Stanford Law School, I served for 11 years in the Office of the Legal 
Adviser in the U.S. State Department, and from 1996–2001, I served in the Office of the Legal 
Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, first as Attaché and from 1998–2001 as Legal 
Counselor. In that capacity, I had the chance to observe carefully the work of the ad hoc tribunals and 
to work closely with many of their senior officials. 
 4. I am by no means the first to observe that international criminal tribunals must engage in the 
sometimes messy practice of politics in carrying out their mandates and, in particular, in seeking to 
secure cooperation from the states in which they are carrying out investigations. In his volume on the 
work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Victor Peskin criticizes what he characterizes the failure to recognize this reality 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/14
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Of course, if one were to ask the Chief Prosecutors of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),5 or the ICC,6 whether they take 
politics into account in making their charging decisions, they would 
almost certainly categorically deny doing so. They would assert that 
decisions about whom to indict are based purely on a dispassionate 
analysis of the law and its application to the prevailing facts. 
I suggest that this is not really the case: I contend that the political 
environment affects international prosecutors’ professional decisions. 
Admittedly, it is difficult for me to provide irrefutable proof of that 
claim—unless a former prosecutor of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, or other 
 
 
as the “idealistic” outlook of “human rights champions” who see tribunals “as engaged in a virtuous 
battle to save international justice . . . .” He continues: “Left unacknowledged, perhaps out of a 
reasonable fear that such acknowledgment will undermine the tribunals’ moral authority, is the fact 
that the tribunals’ fight for cooperation is frequently driven by a legal and political calculus that 
involves bargaining with and concessions to recalcitrant states.” VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE 
COOPERATION 8 (2008). 
 5. According to Louise Arbour, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR: 
The political spirit of accommodation and compromise, which is so crucial for the peaceful 
resolution of all conflicts, is entirely inappropriate when it comes to compliance with the law. 
It is an affront to those who obey it and a betrayal of those who rely on its protection. This, in 
my view, should be the first reminder of what has been activated in Rome last year. It is the 
promise that something greater than force will govern, something that does not get traded 
away, something worthy of trust. 
Press Release, The Hague Appeal for Peace, Introductory Statement by Justice Louise Arbour, 
Prosecutor ICTY and ICTR at the Launch of the ICC Coalition’s Global Ratification Campaign (May 
13, 1999) [hereinafter Arbour Statement], available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7767/en.  
 Similarly, in her memoir of her tenure as Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte recalls 
her reaction to receiving a letter from then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan that chastised her for public 
comments she had made calling for greater political pressure on Serbia. She recounts: 
Whenever I receive a letter of this kind, whether it be from Kofi Annan or ministers of state 
governments, I simply ask myself whether I have broken any law. The answer, inevitably, is 
no. Did I exceed my authority? No. Did I behave within the bounds of my competence? Yes, I 
did. So I deposited the letter in my file and effectively ignored it, because this was political 
interference, and I would resign rather than accept this kind of interference in our work. 
CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH 
HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 106 (2009).  
 6. The former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno-Ocampo has stated:  
[A]s the President of the Court Judge Song said, “The Court is a judicial institution operating 
in a highly political environment.” I shall not be involved in political considerations. I have to 
respect scrupulously my legal limits, my policy is not to stretch the interpretation of the 
norms adopted in Rome. It is the only way to build a judicial institution, to help the political 
actors to perceive the legal limits. To facilitate the work and planning of political actors, I 
inform them in advance of my next steps, and ensure that my Office be transparent and 
predictable. However, my duty is to apply the law without political considerations. Other 
actors have to adjust to the law.  
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Keynote Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC (Feb. 
4, 2010). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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internationalized criminal court improbably publishes a memoir in which 
he or she acknowledges that political considerations played an important 
role in the exercise of his or her prosecutorial functions.7 I will 
nevertheless seek to offer some examples of cases in which international 
criminal courts appeared to have acted, at least in part, on the basis of 
political considerations in carrying out their work. But beyond the claim 
that prosecutors do take politics into account, my stronger claim is that 
prosecutors should take politics into account. They should do so, though, 
in reflective, deliberative ways, not in the reactive and counterproductive 
ways we have at times witnessed in at least a few cases. 
A THRESHOLD QUESTION: WHAT DO I MEAN BY “POLITICS”? 
Before developing the argument further, it is important to address a 
threshold definitional question—in what sense do I mean that the 
prosecutor of an international criminal court should make political 
judgments in developing her prosecution strategy? In the context of an 
investigation of crimes committed during an armed conflict between 
different factions, I do not mean that chief prosecutors should make 
judgments about which party to the war should have its members charged 
with serious violations of international humanitarian law based on political 
 
 
 7. Notwithstanding the general insistence of international criminal prosecutors that their work is 
entirely apolitical, former ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte makes at least some oblique references to the 
role that political considerations may have played in some of her prosecutorial decisions. She describes 
meeting with leaders in Croatia in 2000, following the death of Croatian strongman Franjo Tudjman, 
to demand improved Croatian cooperation with ICTY investigations of cases against Croatian 
defendants. “And to help [Prime Minister Račan] understand that the tribunal was not biased, I told 
him that we had reorganized our investigation teams to put more focus on crimes committed against 
mostly Croats in the towns of Vukovar and Dubrovnik.” DEL PONTE, supra note 5, at 250. In a similar 
vein, Del Ponte, whose efforts to secure cooperation from Serbia were highly contentious and tortuous, 
recounts her attempt to persuade U.S. officials to support her office’s investigations of crimes by 
Kosovar Albanians by suggesting that prosecutions of Kosovar Albanians might improve Serbian 
cooperation: “If the process of justice is to gain some acceptance in Serbia, and thus open the way to 
some degree of reconciliation, [Kosovo Liberation Army] crimes must be exposed.” Id. at 281. Del 
Ponte may have made decisions to increase focus on crimes against Croats or to pursue investigations 
against Kosovar Albanians in an exercise of prosecutorial impartiality because she thought those were 
the most significant crimes for the ICTY to pursue, and not because she thought the pursuit of such 
cases would offer instrumental advantages in trying to improve relations with Croatia and Serbia, 
respectively, but her account is certainly susceptible to the opposite interpretation. In her description of 
a period of improved cooperation between Belgrade and the Tribunal in late 2004 and early 2005, Del 
Ponte herself hints at the linkage between the ICTY’s relationship with Serbia and the Kosovar 
Albanian indictments. She explains that “Serbia did not have to wait long to reap benefits for . . . its 
government’s new attitude towards the tribunal.” Id. at 319. In addition to improved relations with the 
European Union, Del Ponte notes that “[a]gainst the backdrop [of enhanced Serbian cooperation] came 
the arrival in The Hague of the highest-ranking Albanian indicted by the tribunal . . . along with two 
other accused Kosovo Liberation Army commanders.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/14
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considerations. Prosecutors should not decide who should be indicted 
based on whether they sympathize with one side in a conflict as victims or 
detest the other side as villains. I am not suggesting that prosecutors 
should indict individuals based on whether they, or others, share or oppose 
the goals of the government or organization that would be affected by a 
potential indictment. In addition, I am not suggesting that prosecutors 
should make prosecutorial decisions based on whom other political actors 
in the international system—states (powerful or otherwise), NGOs, or 
others—would like to see indicted for the kinds of reasons noted above. 
And I am certainly not arguing that prosecutors should use their 
substantial power to reward friends or to punish opponents. 
Indeed, to the extent we are evaluating the decision of an international 
criminal tribunal to bring its powers to bear on particular individuals, it is 
imperative that prosecutors not be political, and that they make their 
decisions purely based on the evidence and the law, as they insist that they 
do.8 A prosecutor’s office certainly could be political with respect to the 
exercise of these prosecutorial functions, but doing so would be 
indefensible. Acting in such a manner would undermine the tribunal’s 
commitment to the impartiality of the rule of law, which is essential to the 
tribunal’s legitimacy and, in turn, its effectiveness. 
I am instead exhorting courts like the ICC to take account of politics in 
a very different way. The sense in which I am using the term “political” 
could perhaps best be defined as “showing sensitivity to promoting the 
institutional well-being of the court in light of the prevailing geopolitical 
context.”9 I believe that international criminal prosecutors do—and if they 
do not, they should—make these kinds of political judgments by 
developing prosecution strategies that include an evaluation of what will 
enhance the international status, legitimacy, and effectiveness of their 
tribunal in the international system.10 
 
 
 8. See Arbour Statement, supra note 5; DEL PONTE, supra note 5; Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 
6; text accompanying notes 5 & 6. 
 9. Although the working definition here is my own, the concept certainly is not. Antonio Perez 
states in his article that the use of abstention principles by the International Court of Justice can serve 
in enabling the Court to best “participat[e] in the governance of the international community . . . .” 
Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the 
International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 399, 443 (1997). Perez draws heavily on American 
constitutional scholar Alexander Bickel’s work on the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 400. Over 40 years 
ago, Bickel argued that in deciding cases, the Supreme Court “might legitimately consider its own 
institutional self-preservation, and if necessary to maintain its credibility as a non-political institution, 
make pragmatic judgments regarding the best means for implementing constitutional principles.” Id. It 
is these kinds of “pragmatic judgments” I encourage international criminal tribunals to make. 
 10. During the conference during which I delivered the remarks that serve as the basis for this 
essay, Professor Jordan Paust noted that, as lawyers, we ordinarily reject the introduction of political 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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If they are to be successful, international criminal courts in general, and 
the ICC in particular, must depend on the perceptions of states and other 
international actors as to whether they are effectively carrying out their 
mandates. Such courts depend on the support of those states and other 
international actors in carrying out their duties. This implies that they need 
to make judgments and take actions that enhance the court’s authority in 
the international community.11 As Victor Peskin notes in his impressive 
study of the work of the ICTY and ICTR, a prosecutor plays two roles. 
The prosecutor is not only “the trial lawyer who marshals evidence to 
convict war crimes suspects,” but is also “the political strategist who 
maneuvers through the relatively unchartered shoals of the trials of 
cooperation to obtain state compliance for his or her courtroom mission to 
convict.”12 Or, as David Scheffer, a former United States Ambassador for 
War Crimes Issues, said in an interview, a tribunal prosecutor “‘has to be 
as much of a diplomat as a criminal prosecutor . . . .’”13  
PAST POLITICS 
In my view, it is not problematic that international criminal courts in 
general, and prosecutors in particular, do in some cases make political 
judgments—judgments informed by their effort to enhance the 
 
 
considerations into criminal justice processes. He helpfully suggested that I describe the phenomenon I 
am describing in this essay as the need for prosecutors to factor “strategic,” rather than “political,” 
considerations into their charging policies. I was tempted to adopt that formulation and to use it in the 
title of this essay. On reflection, however, I concluded that I really am concerned with the political 
aspects of an international criminal court’s prosecutorial strategies, to the extent that “politics” is 
defined as “activities aimed at improving someone’s status or increasing power within an 
organization.” Definition of Politics, OXFORD DICTIONARIES.COM, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/english/ politics (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). Since my claim is that such a court can and 
should take into account how its prosecutorial strategies will affect its “status or . . . power” within the 
international system, it would seem coy to avoid using the term “politics.” 
 11. Allison Danner couches the point in somewhat different terms, but makes a closely related 
argument: 
[P]ressure exerted [by third party states to promote cooperation with an international court] 
will be critical to the success of the ICC. While states might have strategic reasons to assist 
the Prosecutor in pursuing his cases, cooperation with the Court will certainly be more 
attractive to states and other entities if it is widely viewed as an institution with a significant 
degree of legitimacy. . . . [T]hese entities will be more likely to support the Prosecutor if the 
Court is seen as legitimate, and that actions taken by the Prosecutor can enhance or weaken 
its legitimacy. In order to cope with the weaknesses of the ICC’s enforcement regime, 
therefore, the Prosecutor must seek to enhance the Court’s legitimacy. 
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion of 
the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 535 (2003). 
 12. PESKIN, supra note 4, at 238. 
 13. Id. at 239 (quoting former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David J. 
Scheffer). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/14
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international status of their tribunals—in developing their prosecutorial 
strategies. The more difficult question is whether they do it well. In this 
section, I identify some instances in which I believe international criminal 
courts have made prosecutorial judgments with political considerations in 
mind. In these cases, I contend the political judgments made by court 
officials were not sound, not if we think of political judgments as ones that 
advance the institutional well being of the court in light of the prevailing 
geopolitical context. 
Nearly twenty years ago, in the early days after the establishment of the 
ICTY, the Tribunal faced great pressure from various actors in the 
international community to be seen as doing something to address the 
ongoing atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.14 As a result, the Tribunal 
issued a large number of indictments, many of them based on atrocities at 
detention camps, which overwhelmingly involved low-ranking 
defendants.15 Moreover, when these accused persons began to arrive in 
The Hague, the trial teams in some cases discovered that the evidence 
 
 
 14. Richard Goldstone, the ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor during its earliest years, acknowledges how 
efforts to respond to the prevailing geopolitical context, including a pressing need to secure funding 
for the Tribunal, influenced decisions on the issuance of indictments. He recounts: 
The initial indictments were issued under tremendous pressure to obtain crucial funding from 
the United Nations. Indeed, soon after I arrived in the middle of August 1994, I was told that 
there was no budget for our Tribunal, and that I would have to appear before the budget 
committee of the United Nations at the beginning of November of that year—less than three 
months later. I was advised in a friendly fashion—and correctly as it turned out—that if we 
did not have an indictment out by that time, we would not get any money for the following 
year. The result was that we had to devote all of our meager resources to that endeavor (and 
there were then only twenty-three members of staff in the office, and very few of them were 
investigators). We had the important report from the Commission of Experts (the Bassiouni 
Committee) and we used it to find people against whom there might be sufficient evidence to 
justify indictments. 
 Just before the end of October 1994, we decided there was only one defendant against 
whom there was sufficient evidence available to justify an indictment. His name was Dragan 
Nikolic. We indicted him for a number of murders and the torture of innocent civilians. Now, 
Nikolic was not an appropriate first person for an indictment by the first international war 
crimes tribunal, but we had no option. In order for the work to continue, we had to get out an 
indictment quickly. That is the explanation for the Nikolic indictment. 
Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 277, 281 
(2002). 
 15. Former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte recounts that when she assumed her position as 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY,  
[t]oo many [OTP] investigators were spending an inordinate amount of time and travel money 
exhuming bones, interviewing witnesses to individual criminal acts, and gathering evidence 
applicable only for cases against low-ranking individuals and not for indictments against the 
persons the Security Council had intended the tribunal to pursue: those persons most 
responsible for the crimes who had inhabited the higher political, military, and security 
echelons during the years Yugoslavia was at war. 
DEL PONTE, supra note 5, at 122. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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supporting the Tribunal’s indictments was insufficient to convict the 
defendants at trial. It was not that the accused weren’t guilty; it was just 
that the evidentiary record was not trial-ready. Substantial Office of the 
Prosecutor (“OTP”) resources, consequently, were devoted to essentially 
re-investigating cases to get them ready for trial.16 In addition, most of the 
cases did not involve the most serious offenders, and their prosecution 
diverted the Tribunal from carrying out its most essential functions. 
Indeed, the ICTY was widely criticized for focusing only on “small 
fish.”17 
It seems quite clear, at least in my view, that the ICTY’s OTP made a 
political judgment aimed at what it thought would enhance the 
institutional effectiveness of the tribunal in bringing its initial series of 
indictments. The judgment turned out to be a bad one, a choice that 
ultimately diverted the Tribunal from its mission and that made the ICTY 
vulnerable to criticism by those who in fact sought to undermine its quest 
for international justice. 
Political considerations also appear to have influenced the ICTY’s 
decision to initiate proceedings under Rule 61 of the ICTY’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence during the Tribunal’s early days. Rule 61 
proceedings, which could be brought in cases involving indicted persons 
who had not been detained by their national authorities and transferred to 
the Tribunal, entailed the ex parte in-court presentation of evidence 
against the accused.18 The decision to conduct Rule 61 proceedings 
 
 
 16. ICTY officials, understandably, have not commented widely on this phenomenon. However, 
at least one former prosecutor has commented that the dynamics produced by “public and internal 
expectations . . . that the OTP would immediately issue indictments” led to a focus on cases where a 
U.N. Commission of Experts had carried out preliminary investigations. Minna Schrag, Lessons 
Learned from ICTY Experience Symposium: The ICTY 10 Years On: The View from Inside—The 
Prosecution, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 427, 429 (2004). Schrag continues that “this focus was resource-
intensive and seemed to interfere with the effort to plan a thorough prosecution strategy from the 
outset.” Id. In 1998, then Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour actually elected to withdraw indictments 
against fourteen persons who had previously been indicted by the ICTY in connection with detention 
camp atrocities in order to “balance the available resources within the Tribunal and in recognition of 
the need to prosecute cases fairly and expeditiously.” International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Statement by the Prosecutor Following the Withdrawal of the Charges Against 14 
Accused, CC/PIU/314-E (May 8, 1998), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7671. To be fair, Arbour 
stressed at the time that her decision to withdraw these indictments was not based on a lack of 
evidence against the accused. Id. 
 17. See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary 
on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 777 (1998) (describing the big fish 
versus the small fish debate). 
 18. Rule 61 was included in the original version of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994). All the amended versions of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence are 
available at Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/136 (last visited Apr. 15, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/14
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appears to have been motivated in part by a desire to demonstrate to the 
international community that the Tribunal was moving forward to advance 
the cause of international justice at a time when virtually none of the 
persons indicted by the Tribunal had been transferred to The Hague. Once 
again, the Tribunal was making an effort to be seen as doing at least 
something.19  
Rule 61 proceedings were also employed politically to expose the 
failure of states to arrest indicted war criminals and increase international 
pressure on those states to do so in the future. As an ICTY Trial Chamber 
itself indicated in a Rule 61 proceeding in the case of Radovan Karadzic 
and Ratko Mladic: 
Recourse to the Rule 61 proceedings permits the International 
Criminal Tribunal which does not have a police force, to react to 
failure of the accused to appear voluntarily and to the failure to 
execute the warrants issued against them. . . . Rule 61 proceedings 
permit the charges in the indictment and the supporting material to 
be publicly and solemnly exposed. . . . International criminal 
justice, which cannot accommodate the failures of individuals or 
States, must pursue its mission of revealing the truth about the acts 
perpetrated and suffering endured, as well as identifying and 
arresting those accused of responsibility.20 
Similarly, the International Criminal Court has for its part been 
criticized for failing to think through certain actions that that seem to have 
been motivated by a desire to enhance the Court’s international standing. 
Specifically, the ICC has been criticized for its decision to accept cases 
sent to it by Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the 
Central African Republic as “self-referrals.”21 These cases were likely 
 
 
2013). For a discussion of the operation of Rule 61, see Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., 
Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 231 (1998). 
 19. International criminal tribunal expert William Schabas writes that “[t]he Rule 61 hearing 
procedure was used in the early years of the ICTY, at a time when judges were starved for trial work.” 
William A. Schabas, Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judgments of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 23, 26 (2001). 
 20. Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Cases No. IT-95-8-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review of the 
Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 11, 1996) (emphasis added). 
 21. William Schabas has described the danger that the “self-referral” mechanism can establish “a 
degree of complicity between the Office of the Prosecutor [of the ICC] and the referring state.” 
William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal 
Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 731, 751 (2008). After reviewing the Uganda and Democratic Republic of 
the Congo self-referrals, Schabas concludes that the self-referral mechanism is a “trap” for the ICC’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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seen by the OTP, especially in the Court’s early days, as a way of 
addressing an important geopolitical challenge, namely, the fears of some 
commentators and states, of “overreaching” by the Court. How could 
anyone complain, senior ICC officials may have presumably thought, that 
the ICC had intruded improperly on the sovereignty of states if the states 
involved had invited the Court to take on the situation? But as some 
commentators have noted, this move opened the Court up to criticism that 
it was prosecuting only one side of the atrocities committed during the 
context of the armed conflicts referred to the Court, namely, those 
perpetrated by rebel groups and not those perpetrated by the government 
of the referring state itself.22  
PRUDENT POLITICS: WHAT DO THEY LOOK LIKE? 
Let me return to the broader normative claim I am making: an 
international criminal court should take into account the institutional well-
being of the institution in light of the prevailing geopolitical environment 
and should adopt a prosecution strategy that strengthens, rather than 
weakens, the court’s international standing. I freely concede that by 
suggesting this, I am taking a step onto what could be a very slippery 
slope. Political calculation, after all, is in many ways antithetical to the 
principled and impartial rule of law. If courts are seen as engaging in 
politics, they run the risk of straying from the path indicated by the moral 
and legal compass that is the source of legitimacy and authority for such 
courts. 
How, then, should international criminal courts stay on the “right side 
of the line” in taking political factors into account when developing 
 
 
Office of the Prosecutor and has been exploited by the states making the referrals for political 
purposes. Id. at 753. 
 22. See Schabas, supra note 21, at 751. Schabas has elsewhere voiced concern that ICC favors 
the prosecution of non-state actors, i.e., non-state rebel groups. See William Schabas, Preventing 
Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenges for the United Nations, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L, 
at 2 (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://www.minorityrights .org/1070/reports/preventing-genocide-and-
mass-killing-the-challenge-for-the-united-nations.html. Elsewhere, Schabas has argued: 
The Court was established to deal with impunity, and not to prosecute large-scale crimes in an 
abstract sense. To take Uganda as an example, the problem of impunity does not lie 
principally with the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army, whose leaders can be prosecuted 
adequately under the national legal system once it can apprehend them. The problem with 
impunity in Uganda resides in the fact that pro-government forces are committing atrocities. 
This is not being addressed by either the country’s national judicial system or by the 
International Criminal Court. 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 191 (3d ed. 
2007). 
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prosecution strategies? Allow me to offer some specific suggestions. In 
my view, these suggestions do not undermine the impartial exercise of 
core prosecutorial power. To the contrary, some of them are best seen as a 
cautionary warning about the need for international prosecutors to avoid 
making the kind of reactive political judgments that can get criminal 
tribunals into trouble. A recurrent theme among these ideas is the need for 
international criminal courts to insist, in developing and rolling out their 
prosecution strategies, on moving forward only with indictments of the 
highest quality. 
First, it is critical for international criminal tribunals to bring 
indictments only for cases that can succeed in legal terms. As noted above, 
there have been cases in which it seems the tribunals have issued 
indictments because they were determined to rebut assertions that they 
were not acting quickly enough.23 If we have learned anything, it is that 
international criminal justice is deliberate, even slow. Prosecutors must 
resist the temptation to allow their courts to be used as foreign policy 
instruments to respond to immediate geopolitical crises, as in the former 
Yugoslavia while the war was still underway there. Similarly, international 
courts should avoid bringing indictments of questionable validity in an 
effort to vindicate a contested position about whether particular acts 
qualify as a particular type of international crime. Some critics have 
charged that the ICC’s indictment of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir on 
genocide charges, an issue that has been the subject of considerable 
debate, was driven largely by the ICC’s desire to make “a bold 
demonstration of the court’s purpose.”24 Limiting the charges to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity counts, instead of making a legally 
contestable move aimed at bolstering the Court’s standing, would have 
resulted in a more unimpeachable indictment and would have immunized 
the Court against allegations of politicization.25 
Second, prosecutors should bring charges not only for the most serious 
crimes, but also only against the most serious offenders, i.e., in the words 
of the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, only against “persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.”26 The Statute of the ICC focuses on the gravity of 
 
 
 23. See Goldstone, supra note 14. 
 24. David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court? Finding the Prosecutor Who 
Can Set It Straight, FOR. AFF. 118, 124 (May/June 2011).  
 25. See id. at 125 (citing criticism by the nongovernmental organization the International Crisis 
Group that then-ICC Prosecutor’s approach in bringing genocide charges ‘“risk[ed] politicizing his 
office’”). 
 26. Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone art. 1, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 
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crimes,27 not necessarily the seniority of the offender, but the Prosecutor 
presumably has the power to take into account the rank of a perpetrator in 
deciding whether to bring charges. Moreover, the ICC’s Rome Statute 
provides that one of the factors that should be considered in deciding 
whether a case that otherwise falls within the scope of its jurisdiction is 
admissible is whether the offense is of “sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court.”28 As noted above, the ICTY was hampered for many 
years by the claim that it was a tribunal that tried only the “small fish.”29 
The temptation to bring cases, particularly in the early stages of an 
investigation, against a suspect as to whom an international criminal court 
has gathered extensive information, or who happens to be in custody in a 
friendly country, is great. Such cases can seemingly represent a 
vindication of the international community’s decision to create an 
international criminal justice mechanism. But fully investigating and 
trying these cases consumes substantial resources and can divert the court 
from devoting its attention to the difficult task of developing strong cases 
against senior leaders. 
Third, although prosecutors should go after the accused that bear the 
greatest responsibility for crimes, this may not mean that they should rush 
to indict the very top-level actors in states from which they are seeking 
cooperation, at least not at the outset of a particular investigation. Starting 
with “second-tier” indictees instead may provide an opportunity for a 
court to demonstrate its bona fides in conducting impartial trials. In 
addition, the most senior leaders may be willing to cooperate with a 
tribunal that is investigating their subordinates, even though they would 
reject cooperation with an investigation into their own possible culpability. 
Such an interim period of cooperation can both foster changes in political 
coalitions within a target state and could create momentum for the removal 
of a head of state or government charged with serious international human 
rights violations.30 At a minimum, such an interim period of cooperation 
by a target state can serve to undermine any potential objections advanced 
 
 
(Jan. 16, 2002).  
 27. Article 1 of the Statute of the ICC provides that the Court “shall have the power to exercise 
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.” Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.unhcr. 
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a84.html (emphasis added).  
 28. Id. art. 17(1)(d). 
 29. See Akhavan, supra note 17, at 777. 
 30. See in this regard Victor Peskin’s suggestion that international criminal courts should, among 
other things, consider “[s]trategically timing indictments to mitigate domestic opposition to the arrest 
and transfer of indictees.” PESKIN, supra note 4, at 241. 
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by the state later, when the court’s focus turns to the very top level of 
government.  
The ICTY was well served in both of these ways. It established its 
credibility as an independent judicial institution by conducting a number 
of world-class trials against senior officials before it indicted Slobodan 
Milosevic. The ICTY created a record that provided a persuasive rebuttal 
to challenge Milosevic’s claim that the ICTY was an anti-Serb institution. 
Similarly, in the case of the ICC, its initial strategy in the Sudan situation 
of indicting Interior Minister Ahmad Harun and the Janjaweed militia 
leader Ali Kushayb was a sound one. This was an example of indicting 
serious criminals, but the Court acted without ensuring that it would 
trigger the crisis in relations that would be expected to arise—and that did 
in fact arise—when the Court moved against al-Bashir at the very top level 
of government.31 With hindsight, one might wonder whether the ICC 
would have been better off trying to build an international consensus for 
the surrender of Harun and Kushayb before proceeding with the al-Bashir 
indictment. In short, strategic timing can be critical. 
Fourth, and implicit in everything I have suggested so far, is that 
international criminal prosecutors should resist the temptation to serve as a 
rapid response team to address ongoing international political crises. The 
consensus that developed for ICC action during the height of the Libya 
conflict was short-lived and has, perhaps predictably, given way to a more 
ambivalent international attitude towards international accountability for 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi.32 An excellent example 
of a tribunal resisting the pressure to act immediately to address an 
ongoing international security crisis is the ICTY’s approach towards 
Serbian war crimes in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. During the Serbian 
campaign of violence in Kosovo, many states and NGO voices were 
calling vociferously for an indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, who 
“everybody knew” was guilty of atrocities in Kosovo. Yet then-ICTY 
Prosecutor Louise Arbour was cautious—in my view appropriately so—in 
satisfying herself that the events in Kosovo qualified as an “armed 
conflict” between two organized parties, and that the abuses that were 
taking place consequently fell within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. It was 
more important for the tribunal to get it right than to issue quick 
 
 
 31. Sudan expelled a number of international humanitarian organizations from its territory and 
“lambasted the West” following the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir. Neil 
MacFarquhar & Marlise Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at 
A10. 
 32. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1. 
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indictments to meet the demands of various actors within the international 
community for an additional “talking point” they could use in condemning 
Serbian actions in Kosovo. 
Fifth, international criminal courts should be conscious of couching 
their indictments in a way that minimizes perceptions that it is the conduct 
of an entire state or community, as opposed to indicted individuals, that 
has given rise to criminal charges. Even in conflicts where serious 
atrocities have been committed, the citizens on each side are likely to 
believe that the cause for which they fought was just, even if they are 
prepared to acknowledge that criminal acts took place during the course of 
the fight. Indictments that focus on the criminality of the underlying 
conflict or its causes, as opposed to atrocities committed during it, are 
likely to create intense public backlash against cooperation with the court. 
The ICTY struggled severely with this challenge in connection with its 
indictments of Croatian military leaders who allegedly committed crimes 
during “Operation Storm,” a military campaign aimed at reclaiming 
territory that had been occupied by Serb separatists. Although the ICTY’s 
indictments were based on illegal acts committed in the course of 
Operation Storm and did not purport to challenge the lawfulness of the 
underlying military campaign, the indictments were widely seen in Croatia 
as a rebuke of its sovereign right to re-establish its territorial integrity.33 
Similarly, the use of indictments that charge entire leadership structures 
with membership in a joint criminal enterprise may create the impression 
that the Court is alleging that it is the entire state or community that is 
criminal, not simply a group of named individuals.34  
 
 
 33. See Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting Winners at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 213, 218 (2005) 
(describing how Croatian nationalists “tried to turn the tribunal’s objective of determining individual 
guilt on its head by arguing that the tribunal’s investigations actually cast collective blame on 
Croatians and criminalized the Homeland War”). 
 34. André Nollkaemper, among others, has argued that as a sociological matter, many mass 
atrocity situations are best characterized as instances of “system criminality,” not individual 
criminality, and that “[t]he state is the prime form of a collective entity that is involved in system 
criminality . . . .” André Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International Responsibility for 
International Crimes, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313, 318 (2010). The claim itself is a powerful and 
persuasive one, but there are substantial practical costs for an international criminal court to 
characterize crimes as having been part of a system of state criminality. See Allen S. Weiner, Working 
the System: A Comment on André Nollkaemper’s System Criminality in International Law, 8 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 353, 362 (2010) (arguing that “the highly judgmental notion of system criminality—
if it is employed as a tool to devise legal responses in mass atrocity situations—may increase the 
extent to which members of a society whose agents have committed international crimes identify with 
the perpetrators,” and may accordingly stiffen public resistance to cooperation with an international 
criminal court that brings charges connected to that atrocity situation).  
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Sixth, in the case of the ICC in particular, prosecutors should avoid 
taking unduly aggressive positions on complementarity. Where there is a 
credible case that a state is prepared to hold one of its nationals criminally 
accountable for crimes related to war-time atrocities, the Court should 
resist the temptation to go forward with its own prosecution, even though 
the Court may have invested significant investigative resources in the case. 
William Schabas has observed that the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
at least appeared to be willing to prosecute Thomas Lubanga for genocide 
and crimes against humanity before the ICC determined that the 
complementarity principle did not bar the Court from taking jurisdiction 
over the child conscription charges upon which the Court’s prosecution 
was based.35 But where some credible form of justice can be done 
locally—even if it is not precisely the form of justice available at the 
ICC—there is a danger that the Court will be seen internationally as 
undermining the goals of complementarity.  
Seventh, international criminal prosecutors should be wary of issuing 
indictments in cases where there is a plausible argument that the 
indictment might frustrate ongoing peace processes. To be clear, I am not 
suggesting that an international criminal court should effectively bestow 
immunity on a suspected war criminal merely because he is somehow 
involved—or claims to have a potential role—in peace negotiations. There 
may, however, be important questions of timing about when such an 
indictment should be issued. Even in this qualified form, my suggestion 
that an international criminal court should proceed with caution is not 
categorical, since claims that an indictment will frustrate ongoing peace 
processes are frequently made and often exaggerated.36 There may be 
cases, though, in which there is a genuine tension between peace and 
justice, at least at a particular moment in time, and an international 
criminal court should seek to avoid working at cross-purposes with efforts 
to end wars.37 
 
 
 The effort to separate individual criminal responsibility from state criminality will prove 
particularly challenging if and when the ICC brings prosecutions for the crime of aggression. 
 35. Willam A. Schabas, “Complementarity in Practice”: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 
Presentation for the 20th Anniversary Conference of the International Society for the Reform of 
Criminal Law, at 20 (June 23, 2007), available at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2007/Schabas.pdf.  
 36. For an example of the claim that the risk of international prosecutions can interfere with 
peace processes, see Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS 
47, 55 (Winter 2003) (“the ICC could initiate prosecutions that aggravate bloody political conflicts and 
prolong political instability in the affected regions”).  
 37. In Danner’s words: “The destabilizing effects of misguided prosecutions suggest that the 
Prosecutor should carefully consider his prosecutorial decisions, in terms of their effects both on the 
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Eighth, and perhaps most controversially, international criminal courts 
need to be solicitous of their relations with powerful states in the 
international system. This can be a bitter pill for courts to swallow, since 
states may have political reasons for seeking to inculpate certain 
disfavored states or individuals, to immunize or protect allies, and to use 
international criminal justice processes as bargaining chips in conflict 
settings. But given that the ICC and other international criminal courts 
lack their own enforcement powers, they are dependent on powerful states 
to help secure cooperation with the Court’s work and compliance with its 
orders. Although the ICC must maintain a principled stance, it must also 
realize that the Court was created to advance goals established by states in 
the international system.38 It should ensure that its actions are aimed at 
promoting international peace and security in a way that is not flatly 
inconsistent with the objectives of those powerful states and institutions 
that, in Peskin’s words, are able to serve as the “surrogate enforcers” of 
the Court’s orders.39  
Finally, for the reasons noted above, the ICC should be wary of taking 
cases on the basis of self-referrals unless it is able to extract a public 
commitment from the referring state that it would also accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction if the Court concludes during the course of its investigation 
that crimes were committed by government, as well as non-governmental, 
forces. 
DOING POLITICS, WITHOUT BEING SEEN AS DOING POLITICS 
Although I have suggested that international criminal courts should 
take steps to enhance their own standing in the international system in 
formulating prosecution strategies, it is important for such courts to do this 
on their own—that is, unilaterally—to the greatest extent possible. 
International criminal courts should, in other words, seek to avoid 
projecting a “public image of negotiation” with target states.40 For 
instance, it is one thing for a court to delay the timing of the indictment of 
a head of state in order to build international support for its investigative 
 
 
region where the crime occurred and on the prospects for global justice.” Danner, supra note 11, at 
532. 
 38. Danner argues that states may hold international criminal courts “accountable” in practical 
terms by not supporting them unless the prosecutor is “sensitive to the political implications of his 
prosecutorial decision making, especially on the regions involved in the ICC’s cases. This dynamic 
can enhance the effectiveness of the Court.” Id. at 531. 
 39. PESKIN, supra note 4, at 256. 
 40. Id. at 242. 
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efforts in that country. It is another matter entirely for a prosecutor to 
agree on such a delay with the country involved. In Peskin’s words, “the 
culture of deal-making that can arise may undercut a tribunal’s larger goal 
of obtaining legitimacy from targeted states and winning domestic support 
for the norm of international justice.”41 It can also “increase skepticism . . . 
abroad toward[s] [a] tribunal by imparting the lesson that the tribunal and 
the state are involved in an exercise that has more to do with politics than 
with law.”42 
I fear international criminal prosecutors—despite their public 
pronouncements about their complete independence—have at times failed 
to heed this lesson. For example, I count myself among those who view 
then-ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s decision to issue indictments 
against Kosovo Liberation Army leaders in Kosovo43 as a step that 
appeared publicly as a “bargaining chip” to demonstrate to Serbian leaders 
that the ICTY was not biased against the Serbian side, and as a move to 
advance her efforts to secure greater cooperation from Serbia.44 
CONCLUSION 
In a thoughtful study of one of the ICC’s predecessor tribunals, Rachel 
Kerr concluded that “an international tribunal such as the ICTY cannot 
stand apart from politics.”45 Particularly during an international criminal 
court’s formative years, when it is working to enhance its institutional 
status, legitimacy, and effectiveness in the international system, 
prosecutors should self-consciously recognize that this observation also 
applies to its prosecution strategy. For the most part, the best way the ICC 
can ensure that its prosecution strategy advances its international standing 
is to carry out its functions with a high degree of legal and judicial 
professionalism. It should resist the temptation to react to the way the 
political winds are blowing at any given moment; it should issue only 
meaningful and high-quality indictments that stand the test of time. In one 
sense, the best way the Court can enhance its status, legitimacy, and 
effectiveness in the international system is, ironically, by keeping its 
judicial nose to the grindstone and avoiding high-profile actions self-
consciously calculated to bolster the Court’s image.  
 
 
 41. Peskin, supra note 4, at 243. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See DEL PONTE, supra note 7 (discussing her experience of indicting Albanians). 
 44. Id. 
 45. RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: 
AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 209 (2004). 
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At the same time, the Court and its prosecutorial leaders should 
consider the political impacts their decisions may have, and they should be 
open to balancing their desire for unfettered independence against the 
expected costs or consequences of actions they may take. Prosecutors’ 
legitimate interests in issuing indictments against the most senior leaders 
in a situation over which the Court has jurisdiction does not mean they 
should ignore the potential practical political implications of their actions 
in deciding when the time is right to issue those indictments. Prosecutors 
need not alter their decisions about who should be indicted based on 
political factors, but it may be appropriate for them to alter their position 
about which particular charges to bring, or to think carefully about 
potential domestic political impacts in determining how to draft an 
indictment so as to minimize controversy or domestic backlash. Though 
the Court’s prosecutors should be skeptical of claims that the Court’s 
efforts to secure justice will interfere with attempts to make peace, they 
should at the same time not categorically reject the possibility that this 
may be true in some cases, and they should in such cases calibrate their 
prosecutorial strategies so as to minimize threats to international peace and 
security. Finally, prosecutors at the ICC should take care to ensure that the 
Court’s vision of which situations demand an international criminal justice 
response is not wholly out of alignment with the views of key states in the 
international system. This is both a principled consideration—an 
expression of deference to the legitimate political role states play in 
shaping relations in the international system—and a practical one—a 
sensible strategy calculated to avoid alienating states upon whom the ICC 
must rely as allies in pressing its demands for cooperation. 
There is no doubt that the prosecutors of the ICC, and international 
criminal courts like it, are rightly endowed with great prosecutorial 
independence in charting their prosecutorial strategies. At the same time, 
there is no reason why they should not exercise that independence with 
political prudence. 
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